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Abstract
This paper deals with the estimation of structural models of demand and supply
with incomplete information on prices. When the seller is able to price discriminate,
or the buyer to bargain, individuals pay different prices that are usually not collected
in the data. This paper explores a method to estimate the supply and demand models
jointly when only posted prices are observed. We consider that heterogenous trans-
action prices occur due to price discrimination by firms on observable characteristics
of consumers. Within this framework, the identification is secured by (i) supposing
that at least one group of individuals does pay the posted prices and (ii) assuming
that the marginal costs of producing and selling the goods does not depend on the
characteristics of the buyers. This methodology is applied to estimate the demand in
the new automobile market in France. Results suggest that discounting arising from
price discrimination is important. The average discount is estimated to be 5.2%, with
large variation according to the buyers’ characteristics. Our results are in line with
discounts generally observed in European and American automobile markets.
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1 Introduction
The standard aggregate-level estimation of demand and supply models of differentiated
products relies on the observation of the market shares and the characteristics of the
products, in particular prices (see Berry, 1994). However, because of price discrimination
and price negotiation, precise data on prices may be hard to obtain. Transaction prices for
an identical product may indeed differ from one individual to another. Sellers can practice
third degree price discrimination according to observable demographic characteristics such
as age, gender or town of residence. There may also be room for individual negotiation,
the sellers willing to offer discounts to consumers who argue about the prices and use
competition to obtain better deals. Automobiles, furniture, kitchens or mobile phone
contracts are examples for which there is either documented or anecdotal evidence that
consumers receive some discounts (on automobiles, see, e.g. Harless & Hoffer (2002),
Morton et al. (2003), Chandra et al. (2013) or Langer (2012)). Loans and insured mortgages
have also proved to be negotiable (see Charles et al., 2008 and Allen et al. (2014)). Such
phenomena also exist in vertical relationships between producers and retailers. Producers
are required to edit general terms and conditions of sale. These conditions are then the
starting point for individual negotiation with each retailer.
In all these cases, one typically observes either transaction prices on a small sample issued
from a survey, or only posted prices on a large sample. If, in the first case, price discrimi-
nation can be studied, policy exercises cannot be performed. With large data, on the other
hand, policy simulations are usually done without taking the issue of limited observation
of prices into account. Because the instrumental variables approach used in Berry et al.
(1995) to control for price endogeneity does not solve this nonclassical measurement error
problem (namely, observing posted prices instead of transaction prices), ignoring it gener-
ally results in an inconsistent estimation of the structural parameters and biases in policy
exercises.
This paper proposes a method to estimate a structural demand and supply model with
unobserved transaction prices. Our rationale for the existence of transaction prices below
posted prices is that they allow firms to price discriminate between heterogenous consumers
and thus extract more surplus than they would with an uniform price.1 Sellers have to
edit only one price, namely the posted price, since it is usually legally forbidden to price
1In some cases, all profits could be higher if all firms did not price discriminate (see, e.g. Holmes
(1989), Corts (1998)). But if one cannot commit not to price discriminate, price discrimination occurs for
each firm at equilibrium.
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discriminate between consumers and difficult to implement, but in practice the transac-
tion prices differ from one individual to another. We suppose that sellers use observable
characteristics of the buyers to price discriminate. Importantly, the market shares of all
groups of buyers defined by these characteristics should be observed by the econometri-
cian. This assumption may be problematic in settings where there are few buyers, such as
the producers-retailers example. But it seems plausible that price discrimination is based
on only a few easily observable characteristics, such as sex, age and city of residence, in
markets where the sellers usually do not know the buyers before the transaction.
We then consider on the demand side the random coefficients discrete choice model pop-
ularized by Berry et al. (1995) with unobserved price discrimination. In this case, the
contraction mapping that they use is no longer valid here, and we obtain biased estimates
of mean utilities of products from market shares. Second, to recover parameters from the
mean utilities, Berry et al. (1995) exploit the exogeneity of observed product characteris-
tics (apart from price) and the sum of product characteristics of others to yield moment
conditions involving these parameters. Here, however, transaction prices are unobserved
and enter into the error term, so that all other product characteristics are endogenous.
Instead, we rely on the supply side, and replace the unobserved prices by their expres-
sion stemming from the first-order condition of profit maximization. These conditions
have identifying power under two assumptions. First, the marginal cost of a product is
supposed to be identical for all buyers. This amounts to neglecting differences in selling
costs to different consumers in the total cost of a product. This assumption is likely to
be satisfied in many markets, such as the automobile market, where the major part of the
marginal cost is production, not sale, and the cost of selling is probably not very different
from one consumer to another. The second condition concerns posted prices. We sup-
pose that the sellers post the higher discriminatory price and then offer some discounts
according to demographic characteristics in order to reach discriminatory optimal prices.
This assumption is necessary since otherwise, we could shift all discounts by an arbitrary
constant. It is also consistent with empirical evidence reported for instance by the UK
Competition Commission on the automobile market, showing that some people actually
pay the posted prices (see New cars: A report on the supply of new motor cars within the
UK (2000)).
We then apply our method to the new automobile industry. Following Berry et al. (1995),
the demand for automobile has always been estimated using posted prices when transac-
tion prices are unobserved. Yet, many descriptive studies focusing on price discrimination
(Ayres & Siegelman, 1995, Goldberg, 1996, Harless & Hoffer, 2002, Morton et al., 2003)
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have argued that important dispersion in transaction prices was at stake in the new car
market. In France, it is also commonly admitted that negotiation is possible when purchas-
ing a new car. An article published in Le Figaro (October 2011) suggests that discounts
up to 26% can be obtained. We rely on an exhaustive dataset recording all the registra-
tions of new cars bought by households in France between 2003 and 2008. Apart from
detailed cars attributes, some characteristics of the owner are provided. We observe in
particular age, expected income (namely, the median income of people in the same age
class living in the same municipality). As these characteristics are easily observable by
sellers and presumably strong determinants of purchases, we suppose that they are used
to price discriminate.
Our results suggest that price discrimination is substantial in France. The average discount
is estimated to be 5.2% of the posted price. The major part of estimated discounts is
between 0 and 30% depending on the car purchased and demographic characteristics.
Income appears to be the most important determinant of price discrimination and clearly
negatively correlated to the value of discount. Purchasers under 40 with low income get
the highest discount in average (9%). The average discount for middle-aged purchasers
ais around 6%. The purchasers over 60 with a high income are usually those who pay the
posted price while the ones with a low income get in average 4.9% discount. These results
are in line with Harless & Hoffer (2002). Using observed dealer gross margins, they find
evidence of price discrimination by age group, older buyers paying significant higher prices.
The magnitude of discounts we obtain are also comparable to anecdotal evidences found
in specialized magazines or on internet.
Finally, because unobserved discounts appear to be important here, we show that using
posted prices instead of our method, as is usually done, lead to a substantial underesti-
mation of price sensitivity parameters and an overestimation of mark-ups. We also study
the effect of price discrimination on manufacturers profits and consumers surplus. We
show that if firms did not price discriminate, most of them would be worse off. The gains
appear to be larger for luxury brands and French brands that have important market
shares. On the consumer side, as the theory suggests, they are winners and losers but
price discrimination is moderately welfare enhancing.
We propose a methodology to overcome the problem of unobserved transaction prices
in the standard framework of the widely used Berry et al. (1995) demand and supply
model. However, we believe that this methodology can have can be easily extended to
other demand and supply models. This method has a lot of applications when the data
collected by the econometrician is either unreliable or restricted. Our methodology is useful
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when the econometrician observes the demand for different markets but the prices for only
a subset of these market (for example, cars in different European countries or supermarket
chains is different municipalities).
The paper is organized as follows. The first section presents the model and explains how
to deal with the unobserved transaction prices in the estimation. The application on the
French new cars market is developed in the second part of the paper. Section 3 analyzes
the importance of discounts and the impact of price discrimination. We conclude in Section
4.
2 Theoretical model
We first present our theoretical model. The approach is identical to the BLP model except
that the demand arises from a finite number of heterogenous groups of consumers. The
firms are supposed to observe the group of each consumer, as well as their corresponding
characteristics, such as their average price elasticity. They then price discriminate among
these groups, in order to take advantage of the heterogeneity in preferences.
Specifically, heterogenous consumers are supposed to be segmented in nD groups of con-
sumers, and we denote by d the group of consumer i. Each consumer chooses either to
purchase one of the J products or not to buy any, which is the outside option denoted by
0. As usually, each product is assimilated to the bundle of its characteristics. Consumers
are utility maximizers, and the utility of choosing j is supposed to be a linear function of
characteristics:
Udij = Xjβ
d
i + ξ
d
j + α
d
i p
d
j + 
d
ij,
where Xj corresponds to the vector of observed characteristics and ξdj represents the valua-
tion of unobserved characteristics. pdj is the price set by the seller for the category d and is
not observed by the econometrician. Consumers with characteristics d are supposed to face
the same transaction price pdj . This is crucial, but not more restrictive than the assumption
that ξdj is common to all individuals with characteristics d, shown by Berry & Haile (2010)
to be necessary for identifying demand models nonparametrically from aggregated data.
In other words, we need to abstract from individual negotiation in this model.
We assume, as usually, that individual parameters can be decomposed linearly into a mean,
an individual deviation from the mean and a deviation related to individual characteristics:{
βi = β
d
0 + pi
X,d
0 Ei + Σ
X,d
0 ζ
X
i
αi = α
d
0 + pi
p,d
0 Ei + Σ
p,d
0 ζ
p
i ,
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where Ei denotes demographic characteristics that are unobserved by the firm for each
purchaser but whose distribution is common knowledge. ζi = (ζXi , ζ
p
i ) is a random vector
with a specified distribution such as the standard multivariate normal distribution. We
suppose, as usually, that the idiosyncratic error terms dij are extreme-value distributed.
The utility function can be expressed as a mean utility and an individual deviation from
this mean:
Udij = δ
d
j (p
d
j ) + µ
d
j (Ei, ζi, p
d
j ) + 
d
ij,
with
δdj (p
d
j ) = Xjβ
d
0 + α
d
0p
d
j + ξ
d
j
and
µdj (Ei, ζi, p
d
j ) = Xj
(
piX,d0 Ei + σ
X,d
0 ζ
X
i
)
+ pdj
(
pip,d0 Ei + σ
p,d
0 ζ
p
i
)
.
We let the dependence in pdj explicit for reasons that will become clear below. Because
of the logistic assumption on the dij, the aggregate market share sdj (pd) of good j for
demographic group d satisfies, when prices are set to pd = (pd1, ..., pdJ),
sdj (p
d) =
∫
sdj (e, u, p
d)dP dE,ζ(e, u), (1)
where P dE,ζ is the distribution of (E, ζ) for group d and
sdj (e, u, p
d) =
exp
(
δdj (p
d
j ) + µ
d
j (e, u, p
d
j )
)∑J
k=0 exp
(
δdk(p
d
k) + µ
d
k(e, u, p
d
k)
)
Now, we consider a Nash-Bertrand competition setting where firms are able to price dis-
criminate by setting different prices to each of the nD consumers groups. Letting Jf denote
the set of products sold by firm f , the profit of f when the vector of all prices for group d
is pd satisfies
pij =
nD∑
d=1
P (D = d)
∑
j∈Jf
sdj (p
d)× (pdj − cdj) .
sdj (p
d) is the market share of product j for group d when prices are equal to pd. cdj is the
marginal cost of the product j for group d.
The first-order condition for the profit maximization yields:
pdf = c
d
f +
(
Ωdf
)−1
sdf , (2)
where pdf , cdf and sdf are respectively the equilibrium transaction prices, marginal costs and
observed market shares vectors for firm f . Ωdf is the matrix of typical (i, j) term equal
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to ∂sj
∂pi
(pd). The optimal prices are the consequence of the firms making the traditional
arbitrage between increasing prices and lowering sales. When a seller is able to price
discriminate, it is less constrained than with a uniform pricing strategy since this arbitrage
is made for each group separately. If a group is particularly price sensitive, the seller offers
a low price and is still able to extract a lot of surplus for the less price sensitive group
by setting a higher price for this group. Note that even if price discrimination is illegal,
enforcing such a law may be difficult because consumers can hardly sue firms, at least if
they pay less than the posted price. We thus assume that the posted prices p = (p1, ..., pJ)
satisfy
pj ≥ max
d=1...nD
pdj . (3)
We shall reinforce this assumption below, for identification purpose.
3 Inference
We now turn to inference on this model. We assume that the econometrician observes the
market shares sdj corresponding to each consumer group but not the discriminatory prices
pdj paid by consumers. We do assume, on the other hand, that the econometrician observes
the posted prices.
First, let us recall the standard case where the true prices are observed. Let
θd0 = (β0
d
, α0
d, piX,d0 ,Σ
X,d
0 , pi
p,d
0 ,Σ
p,d
0 )
denote the true vector of parameters for group d. The standard approach for identifica-
tion and estimation of θd0, initiated by BLP, is to use the exogeneity of Zj, which includes
the characteristics Xj and other instruments (typically, function of characteristics of other
products or cost shifters) to derive moment conditions involving θd0. The exogeneity con-
dition takes the form
E
[
Zjξ
d
j
]
= 0. (4)
The idea is then to use the link between ξdj and the true parameters θd0 through Equation
(1). Specifically, we know from Berry (1994) that for any given vector θd, the equation (1),
where θd0 is replaced by θd, defines a bijection between market shares and mean utilities of
products δdj . Hence, we can define δdj (sd, pd; θd), where sd = (sd1, ..., sdJ) denotes the vector of
observed market shares. Once δdj (sd, pd; θd) is obtained, the vector ξdj (pd, θd) of unobserved
characteristic corresponding to θd and rationalizing the market shares follows easily since
ξdj (p
d; θd) = δdj (s
d, pd; θd)−Xjβd − αdpdj .
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The moment conditions used to identify and estimate θd0 are then
E
[
Zjξ
d
j (p
d; θd0)
]
= 0. (5)
Now let us turn to the case where the true prices are unobserved. First, remark that when
observed prices are different from the true prices (for example when posted prices are used
instead of transaction prices), the former approach is not valid in general. To see this,
consider the simple logit model, where piX,d0 ,Σ
X,d
0 , pi
X,d
0 and Σ
X,d
0 are known to be zero. In
this case δdj (sd, pd; θd) takes the simple form
δdj (s
d, pd; θd) = ln sdj − ln sd0
and does not depend on pd. In this context, using posted prices p instead of the true prices
amounts to relying on
ξdj (p; θ
d) = ln sdj − ln sd0 −Xjβ
d − αdpd,
instead of on ξdj (pd; θd). If the measurement errors pd−pdj on the true prices were classical,
then E
[
Zj(p
d − pdj )
]
= 0 would be credible and we would still have
E
[
Zjξ
d
j (p
d; θd0)
]
= 0. (6)
However, pd− pdj is not a standard measurement error, in particular because the true price
depends on the characteristics of the good. If for instance a group of consumer values
particularly the horsepower of automobiles, powerful cars will be priced higher for this
group. Thus, pd − pdj will be negatively correlated with horsepower. Because horsepower
itself is correlated with the instruments, as required for the instruments to be relevant, in
general we will have E[Zj(pd − pdj )] 6= 0, and (6) no longer holds. In the general random
coefficient model, this issue also arises but on top of that, δdj (sd, pd; θd) generally depends
on pd. Thus, we also commit an error at this stage that is likely to make (6) invalid, even
if the measurement error pd − pdj were independent of pdj .
Instead of simply replacing pd by p, we use the supply model and reasonable identifying
conditions on marginal costs and posted prices to recover, given a set of demand parameters
θd, the corresponding transaction prices pd(θd). Once these transaction prices are recovered,
we can use the standard BLP method to compute ξdj (pd(θd); θd) and then the moment
conditions E[Zjξdj (pd(θd); θd)], to check whether they are equal to zero or not.
The first identifying condition we impose is that the marginal cost of a product is identical
for all buyers, so that cdf = cf for all d and f . This amounts to neglecting differences in
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the costs of selling to different consumers in the total cost of a product. This assumption
is likely to be satisfied in many settings, such as the automobile market, where most costs
stem from producing, not selling the goods. Second, we suppose that firms post the higher
discriminatory price and then offer some discounts according to observable characteristics
of buyers in order to reach optimal discriminatory prices. In other words, instead of having
simply the inequality (3), we impose
pj = max
d=1...nD
pdj .
This implies that, for each product j, there is a group dj, called the pivot group hereafter,
that pays the posted price, pdjj = pj. This assumption is necessary since otherwise, we
could shift all discounts by an arbitrary constant. It is also in line with empirical evidence
on the automobile market (a survey conducted in 1990 in the UK reveals that 17% of car
purchasers paid the posted price).2 Note however that the pivot group is neither supposed
to be known ex ante nor constant across different products.
Under these two additional restrictions, we have, by the first-order condition of the Nash-
Bertrand equilibrium,
pj = cj + max
d=1...nD
[(
Ωdf
)−1
sdf
]
j
,
where [.]j indicate that we consider the j-th line of the vector only. Then the discriminatory
prices satisfy
pdj = pj − max
d=1...nD
[(
Ωdf
)−1
sdf
]
j
+
[(
Ωdf
)−1
sdf
]
j
. (7)
Hence, the discriminatory prices are identified up to Ωdf . Now, using (1), we obtain, after
some algebra,
∂sdj
∂pdj
(pd) =
∫ (
αd0 + pi
p,d
0 e+ Σ
p,d
0 u
p
)
sdj (e, u, p
d)(1− sdj (e, u, pd))dP dE,ζ(e, u) (8)
We get a similar expression for ∂sdj/∂pdl (pd). This shows that Ωdf depends only on the
parameters θd0 and on the δdj , through sdj (e, u, pd). Besides, we still can define, for a given
set of parameters and transaction prices, the vector of mean utilities δdj (sd, pd; θd). Hence,
to obtain the discriminatory prices for a given vector of parameter θ = (θ1, ..., θnD), we
have to solve a system of non-linear equations in δ = δ1, . . . , δnD and the transaction prices
p = (p1, . . . , pnD). We use, for that purpose, the following iterative procedure:
1. Start from pd,0 = p¯ for all groups.
2See the UK Competition Competition report : New cars: A report on the supply of new motor cars
within the UK (2000).
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2. Given the current vector of transaction prices pd, compute δd = δ(sd, pd; θd). We can
use for that purpose the contraction mapping suggested by BLP.
3. Given the current vector of mean utilities, compute the corresponding matrix Ωdf and
update the transaction prices, using (7).
4. Iterate 2 and 3 until convergence of prices and mean utilities.
It seems difficult to prove that the nonlinear system of equations mentioned above admits a
unique solution, and that the previous procedure should necessarily converge. In practice,
however, we always obtained convergence and did not face any dependence on the initial
choice pd,0 of pd.
Finally, we can apply GMM to identify and estimate θ0 = (θ10, ..., θ
nD
0 ). Let
MdJ (θ) =
1
J
J∑
j=1
Zj
(
δdj (θ)−Xjβd − αdpdj (θ)
)
denote the empirical counterpart to the moment conditions in (5). Let also MJ(θ) =
(M1J(θ)
′, ...,MnDJ (θ)
′)′ and define
QJ(θ) = MJ(θ)
′WJMJ(θ),
where WJ is a positive definite matrix. Our GMM estimator of θ is
θ̂ = arg min
θ
QJ(θ).
It is also possible to take advantage of the structure imposed on the supply side to construct
an additional set of moments. Let Xs be the vector of cost shifters. As usually, we specify
the marginal cost as log-linear :
ln(cj) = X
s
j γ + ωj,
where ωj stands for the unobserved cost shock. It is possible to recover cj from any group
d using the transaction price and the theoretical margin equation (2):
cj = p
d
j −
[(
Ωdf
)−1
sdf
]
j
.
We can also recover ωj(θ, γ):
ωj = ln
(
pdj −
[(
Ωdf
)−1
sdf
]
j
)
−Xsj γ
and construct the supply moment condition :
M sJ(θ, γ) =
1
J
J∑
j=1
Zj
[
ln
(
pdj −
[(
Ωdf
)−1
sdf
]
j
)
−Xsj γ
]
Then we can proceed as previously, simply replacing MJ(θ) by MJ(θ, γ) = (M1J(θ, γ)′, ...,
MnDJ (θ, γ)
′,M sJ(θ, γ))
′.
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3.1 Particular cases
We investigate here two restricted versions of the general model where the identification
of transaction prices together with demand parameters is obvious and the estimation pro-
cedure is simplified. The first model is the random coefficient model without random
coefficient on the price variable (partial random coefficients model) and the second is the
nested logit model.
3.1.1 The partial random coefficients model
In this model, we consider that all consumers inside a given demographic group have the
same price sensitivity, αdi = α¯d. We can apply the same method as previously, by first
recovering the transaction prices and then compute the corresponing error term to yield
the moment conditions. The main difference with previously is that in this specification,
the µdj (e, u, pdj ) function does not depend on the transaction price pdj anymore. As a result,
δ(sd, pd; θd) does not depend either on pd. In this case, instead of solving jointly for δ and
the transaction prices p, we can solve for both sequentially. We first compute, for a given
set of parameters θd, the mean utilities δ(sd, pd; θd). Then we compute the corresponding
Ωdf and transaction prices. Thus, the computational cost is significantly reduced compared
to the general method.
3.1.2 The nested logit case
The nested logit model is very frequently used to model the demand for differentiated goods.
Its popularity comes from its simplicity to implement, the market share inversion is linear
and does not rely on the use of the contraction mapping, which decreases the computational
intensity. Yet, the nested logit does not impose too much restriction on substitution
patterns, contrary to the logit model. Thanks to the nested structure, (products are
segmented into homogeneous groups), we obtain more substitution inside groups than
across groups of products.
However, when we introduce unobserved price discrimination, the model is no longer linear
and must be estimated using the GMM approach. But the estimation method is simpler
than the full random coefficients and partial random coefficients models presented before.
The same remark applies of course to the simple logit model.
In the nested logit approach, consumers with same characteristics d are supposed to have
homogeneous preferences, so that the term µdj (e, u, pdj ) is actually zero. On the other hand,
in order to obtain still realistic substitution patterns, the error terms corresponding to
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products of a same segment g are assumed to be correlated through a parameter denoted
σd. Aggregate market shares then take the simple form
ln sdj/s
d
0 = δ
d
j + σ
d ln sdj/g,
where sdj/g denotes the market share of j inside segment g for group d. We also have the
simple expression
∂sdj
∂pdj
= αdsdj
(
sdj +
σd
1− σd s
d
j/g −
1
1− σd
)
.
As a result, Ωdf , and therefore the transaction prices, do not depend on δ. The transaction
prices only depend on the observed market shares and on the parameters (α1, σ1, ..., αnD , σnD).
Denoting them by pdj (α1, ..., σnD), we obtain the moment equations
E
[
Zj
(
ln
sdj
sd0
−Xjβd − αdpdj (α1, ..., σnD)− σd ln sdj/g
)]
= 0.
This moment equation is far simpler to solve than in the general model because (i) each term
in the left hand side is easy to compute and (ii) one has to optimize on (α1, σ1, ..., αnD , σnD)
only, since once they are fixed, βd can easily be obtained by 2SLS on each group of con-
sumers. This reduces the dimension on which to optimize to 2×nD parameters.
4 Application to the French new car market
4.1 Description of the data
We apply our methodology to estimate demand and transactions prices in the new au-
tomobile industry using a dataset of the association of French automobile manufacturers
(CCFA, Comité des Constructeurs Français d’Automobiles) that records all the registra-
tions of new cars bought by households in France between 2003 and 2008. Each year,
we observe a sample of about two million vehicles. For each registration, the following
attributes of the car are reported: brand, model, fuel energy, car-body style, number of
doors, horsepower, CO2 emissions, cylinder capacity and weight. These characteristics
have been complemented with fuel prices, so as to compute the cost of driving (in euros
for 100 kilometers). Automobile sellers are well known to price discriminate, negotiate or
to offer discounts to close the deal. As in the setting, we only observe posted prices that
come from manufacturers catalogues.
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We now turn to the construction of the consumer groups that we suppose firms use to
price discriminate. Apart from cars attributes, the date of the registration and some char-
acteristics of the owner are provided in the CCFA database, in particular his municipality
of residence and his age. The age (or the age class) is presumably a strong determinant
of purchase, and is easily observable by a seller even if he does not know the buyer before
the transaction. We therefore suppose that it is used by the automobile makers to price
discriminate. The income is also likely to affect preferences for different car attributes
and price sensitivity. The income is however likely to be unobserved by the seller but
instead inferred from the municipality the buyer lives in and the age class. We compute
a predictor of buyer’s income, namely the median household income in his age class and
in his municipality using data from the French national institute of statistics (Insee).3 It
seems reasonable to assume that the seller does not have a far better prediction of the
buyer’s income in such anonymous market, where buyers and sellers do not know each
other before the transaction. It is crucial for our approach that buyers cannot lie about
their individual characteristics4 and we believe that buyers have high incentive to buy a
new car at a close dealer especially for the after-sale services. At the end, we define groups
of buyers by interacting three age classes and two income classes.5 The six groups and
their corresponding frequency in the data are presented in Table 1.
Group Characteristics Frequency
1 Age < 40, income <27,000 15.7%
2 Age < 40, income >27,000 11.5%
3 Age ∈ [40,59], income <27,000 16.3%
4 Age ∈ [40,59], income >27,000 22.3%
5 Age ≥ 60, income <27,000 20.8%
6 Age ≥ 60, income >27,000 13.2%
Table 1: Definition of the groups of consumers and frequency
When defining the groups of consumers, we face a trade-off between realism (it is likely
3There are over 36,000 municipalities in France. Paris as well as the second and third biggest cities are
split in smaller units (‘’arrondissement‘’). There is significant heterogeneity in the distribution of median
incomes across municipalities.
4We do not consider that sellers discriminate according to the gender because if women (or men) are
known to get higher discount it would be easy to send the husband (or wife), a relative or a friend to buy
the car.
5We use another definition of demographic groups using six age classes. The results, not reported here,
are similar.
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that firms discriminate along several dimensions) and accuracy of the observed proportion
of sales ŝdj as estimators of the true market shares sdj . Contrary to linear models where
standard measurement errors on outcomes are not problematic, here measurement error can
bias the results because by Jensen’s inequality, E
(
ln ŝdj
)
< lnE(ŝdj ) = ln s
d
j . Moreover, one
can show that the relative bias increases as sdj goes to zero, implying that this measurement
error becomes more problematic with a large number of groups. Finally, even if in theory
sdj > 0 so that ln sdj is always well defined, we may observe ŝdj = 0, in which case ln ŝdj is
not defined. The six groups that we consider are large enough to avoid in most cases this
zero sale issue. When it occurs, however, rather than discarding the products, we replace
ŝdj by a predictor that minimizes the bias : sdj =
ndj+0.5
Nd
, ndj denoting the number of sales of
product j in group d and Nd the number of potential buyers with characteristics d.6
We define a product as a brand, model, segment, car-body style and fuel type. A total of
3205 products for the six years is obtained.7 Table 2 presents the average characteristics
of new cars purchased for each group of consumers. We find significant heterogeneity. The
average price of vehicles increases with the income. Purchases of medium age class are, in
average, more expensive. The chosen cars are also bigger (with a higher weight) and with
higher horsepower. Young purchasers are more interested in smaller cars (lighter and/or
with three doors) whereas station-wagons are more popular among the medium age class.
The higher age group of consumers purchases lighter vehicles than medium age classes, but
these vehicles are in average less fuel efficient (with higher fuel costs).
Consumer group Price Fuel cost HP Weight Three doors Station Wagon
1 A < 40, I <27,000 19,803 6.2 5.7 1,182 19.0% 9.7%
2 A < 40, I >27,000 20,911 6.5 6.0 1,221 16.8% 12.9%
3 A ∈ [40,59], I <27,000 21,521 6.5 6.1 1,231 14.3% 12.7%
4 A ∈ [40,59], I >27,000 21,739 6.8 6.2 1,236 14.8% 13.1%
5 A ≥ 60, I <27,000 20,117 6.9 5.9 1,194 11.4% 8.9%
6 A ≥ 60, I >27,000 20,831 7.0 6.0 1,219 10.9% 10.5%
Lecture notes : A represents the age class and I the income class. Prices are in constant
(2008) euros, fuel cost is the cost of driving 100 kilometers, in constant (2008) euros, HP
stands for horsepower, weight is in kilograms.
Table 2: Average characteristics of new cars purchased across groups of consumers
6Gandhi et al. (2013) propose a method to deal with null market based on the use of inequality moments,
however we believe that it is beyond the scope of the paper.
7See Table 13 in Appendix A.1 for the fraction of products with null market shares.
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The dataset does not contain any information on the distribution network and the dis-
tribution sector is not modeled in this application. We make the traditional assumption
that manufacturers and their dealers are perfectly integrated. Another related assumption
is that there is no variation in competition across geographic market. In reality, a lot of
dealers are independent and choose their own pricing and discounting strategy. Further-
more, dealers are not uniformly located on the French territory so there may exist some
difference in competition intensity across geographic market. With sales at the dealers
level, or the locations of dealers, we would be able to take into account heterogeneity of
pricing strategy or competition intensity (see, e.g., Nurski & Verboven, 2012). Due to a
lack of such available data, we abstract from these issues afterwards.
4.2 Estimation results
We present the estimations of different models. We estimate the standard logit model and
the logit model with unobserved price discrimination. For the estimation of these two mod-
els, we do not use supply moment conditions. Then we estimate the standard BLP model
and the BLP model with unobserved price discrimination. All the models are estimated
using the GMM approach. For the logit models, we use only demand-side moment condi-
tions while we use the supply-side moment conditions for the random coefficients models.
For all specifications, we control for the main characteristics of the cars such as horsepower,
weight, the cost of driving 100 kilometers (computed by introducing annual average fuel
prices) in the demand function. We also introduce dummies for station-wagon car-body
style and three doors. Finally, we introduce year and brand dummies that are constrained
to be identical for all demographic groups. For the BLP models (standard and with un-
observed price discrimination), we allow for unobserved heterogeneity of preferences inside
groups of consumers for price, horsepower, fuel cost, weight and for the utility of holding a
car (represented by the intercept). We constrain the heterogeneity parameters to be con-
stant across groups.8 In the marginal cost equation, we use horsepower, fuel consumption
(in liter for 100 kilometers) and weight as cost-shifters. We also introduce brand dummies
to control for manufacturer’s specific unobserved quality of cars.
We construct demand and supply moment conditions using instrumental variables. In
addition to exogenous characteristics we construct three sets of instruments. The first is
composed by the sums of continuous characteristics (namely weight, horsepower and fuel
cost) of other brands’ products, the second is the sums of these characteristics over other
8This constraint helps to identify the parameters of heterogeneity. We observe 6 years and 6 groups of
consumers which gives a total of 36 markets.
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brands’ products of the same segment, supposed to be closer substitutes. The third set
of instrumental variables is the sums of these characteristics of the other products of the
brand belonging to the same segment.9
The implementation of the estimation method uses the nested fixed point to inverse the
market share, using a tight tolerance value of (10−12). To compute the transaction prices,
we also use a contraction mapping and set the tolerance to (10−6) (it is equivalent to a
cent of euro). To approximate the market share function, we prepare 1000 Halton normal
draws. Specifically, we draw a set of 1000 individuals for each demographic group and
each year. We use the simplex minimization algorithm. We carefully investigate potential
convergence issues, as suggest Knittel & Metaxoglou (2014), using different starting values.
First of all, we compare the estimates of the model with unobserved price discrimination to
the standard model for the simple logit case (columns (1) and (2)) and random coefficients
model (columns(3) and (4)). In the standard models, we assume that the posted prices are
paid by all consumers. For the standard BLP model, the supply-side model also differs from
our model since it assumes that the posted prices are the optimal non-discriminatory prices,
given the heterogeneous preferences of the different groups of consumers. The results for the
different models are presented in Tables 3 and 4. The estimated parameters are generally
similar for the logit models and the BLP models. In the logit case, the estimations are
barely affected when we use our methodology or when we use the posted prices. However,
for the BLP models, the estimation results imply much lower price sensitivity parameters
with unobserved price discrimination. The less price sensitive group is however always
the same, namely the group of old consumers with high income. The deviation of the
price sensitivity parameter is higher for the BLP model with unobserved prices than for
the standard model (1.09 versus 0.70). The intercept is negative, reflecting the fact that
the major part of consumers choose the outside option (not to buy a car or buy it on the
second-hand market). There is a significant heterogeneity in the utility of holding a car
across demographic groups, the young purchasers being the ones with the highest utility.
The mean parameters of preference for horsepower surprisingly appear to be negative in the
standard BLP specification but become positive for the full model with unobserved price
discrimination. The standard deviation from the means is also much higher for the BLP
model (4.26) than for the model with price discrimination (-0.23). As expected, all groups
of consumers dislike large fuel expenses. The parameters of sensitivity to the fuel cost are
consistent with the sensitivity to the car price parameters. The old consumers with high
income appear to be also the less sensitive to the cost of driving while the more sensitive
9See the segmentation used in Table 15, Appendix A.1.
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consumers are also the young and middle-age groups with a low income. As weight is a
proxy for the size and the space of the car, it is positively valuated by all the consumers.
Three doors and station-wagon vehicles are negatively valuated, reflecting that most of the
consumers buy sedan cars with five doors (four doors plus the trunk). The cost equation
parameters have the predicted signs : the marginal cost of production is increasing in the
horsepower and weight while it is less costly to produce inefficient cars (i.e with higher fuel
consumption).
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Standard Logit Logit + unobs. prices Standard BLP BLP + unobs. prices
Parameter Std-err Parameter Std-err Parameter Std-err Parameter Std-err
Price sensitivity
Age < 40, I = L -2.72∗∗ 0.21 -2.72∗∗ 0.21 -2.8∗∗ 0.241 -4.88∗∗ 0.395
Age < 40, I = H -2.54∗∗ 0.2 -2.54∗∗ 0.2 -2.72∗∗ 0.259 -3.92∗∗ 0.286
Age ∈ [40,59], I = L -2.22∗∗ 0.2 -2.22∗∗ 0.2 -2.16∗∗ 0.224 -4.3∗∗ 0.359
Age ∈ [40,59], I = H -2.07∗∗ 0.2 -2.07∗∗ 0.2 -2.15∗∗ 0.214 -4.04∗∗ 0.359
Age ≤ 60, I = L -2.02∗∗ 0.2 -2.02∗∗ 0.2 -2.36∗∗ 0.229 -4.09∗∗ 0.372
Age ≤ 60, I = H -1.88∗∗ 0.19 -1.89∗∗ 0.19 -1.91∗∗ 0.232 -3.46∗∗ 0.237
std deviation (σp) 0.7∗∗ 0.089 1.09∗∗ 0.081
Intercept
Age < 40, I = L -7.77∗∗ 0.28 -8.21∗∗ 0.33 -4.13∗∗ 0.301 -5.87∗∗ 0.48
Age < 40, I = H -8.48∗∗ 0.27 -8.83∗∗ 0.32 -5.29∗∗ 0.301 -6.18∗∗ 0.338
Age ∈ [40,59], I = L -8.43∗∗ 0.26 -8.6∗∗ 0.31 -5.07∗∗ 0.298 -6.58∗∗ 0.43
Age ∈ [40,59], I = H -8.49∗∗ 0.26 -8.58∗∗ 0.31 -5.28∗∗ 0.295 -6.82∗∗ 0.416
Age ≤ 60, I = L -8.05∗∗ 0.25 -8.11∗∗ 0.3 -5.04∗∗ 0.289 -6.19∗∗ 0.418
Age ≤ 60, I = H -8.4∗∗ 0.25 -8.39∗∗ 0.25 -5.33∗∗ 0.322 -6.61∗∗ 0.341
std deviation (σx) -0.18 0.111 -0.24 0.173
Horsepower
Age < 40, I = L 5.77∗∗ 0.56 5.77∗∗ 0.56 -5.68∗∗ 0.904 8.1∗∗ 0.952
Age < 40, I = H 5.06∗∗ 0.54 5.05∗∗ 0.54 -5.58∗∗ 0.992 4.42∗∗ 0.432
Age ∈ [40,59], I = L 4.14∗∗ 0.53 4.13∗∗ 0.53 -6.98∗∗ 0.876 6.41∗∗ 0.821
Age ∈ [40,59], I = H 3.59∗∗ 0.52 3.59∗∗ 0.51 -6.97∗∗ 0.822 5.66∗∗ 0.768
Age ≤ 60, I = L 3.04∗∗ 0.52 3.05∗∗ 0.52 -7.12∗∗ 0.939 4.93∗∗ 0.783
Age ≤ 60, I = H 2.67∗∗ 0.5 2.69∗∗ 0.5 -8.39∗∗ 0.955 0.68† 0.407
std deviation (σx) 4.26∗∗ 0.244 -0.23 0.244
Fuel cost
Age < 40, I = L -6.73∗∗ 0.27 -6.73∗∗ 0.27 -5.77∗∗ 0.291 -8.01∗∗ 0.653
Age < 40, I = H -5.86∗∗ 0.26 -5.85∗∗ 0.26 -4.96∗∗ 0.296 -5.83∗∗ 0.558
Age ∈ [40,59], I = L -5.83∗∗ 0.25 -5.83∗∗ 0.25 -4.9∗∗ 0.278 -7.18∗∗ 0.598
Age ∈ [40,59], I = H -4.94∗∗ 0.25 -4.94∗∗ 0.25 -3.88∗∗ 0.272 -6.03∗∗ 0.576
Age ≤ 60, I = L -4.23∗∗ 0.25 -4.23∗∗ 0.25 -3.12∗∗ 0.275 -5.3∗∗ 0.579
Age ≤ 60, I = H -3.61∗∗ 0.24 -3.62∗∗ 0.24 -2.16∗∗ 0.278 -2.88∗∗ 0.512
std deviation (σx) -1.25∗∗ 0.155 0.65 0.699
Weight
Age < 40, I = L 4.8∗∗ 0.4 4.8∗∗ 0.4 5.92∗∗ 0.352 5.76∗∗ 0.615
Age < 40, I = H 4.97∗∗ 0.39 4.96∗∗ 0.39 6.22∗∗ 0.364 4.86∗∗ 0.384
Age ∈ [40,59], I = L 4.88∗∗ 0.38 4.88∗∗ 0.38 5.9∗∗ 0.358 5.77∗∗ 0.54
Age ∈ [40,59], I = H 4.67∗∗ 0.38 4.67∗∗ 0.38 5.92∗∗ 0.334 5.61∗∗ 0.532
Age ≤ 60, I = L 3.68∗∗ 0.38 3.69∗∗ 0.38 5.07∗∗ 0.349 4.56∗∗ 0.527
Age ≤ 60, I = H 3.74∗∗ 0.36 3.75∗∗ 0.36 4.94∗∗ 0.369 4.84∗∗ 0.3
std deviation (σx) -0.19 0.418 0.17 0.572
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Table 3: Estimation of parameters : logit model, logit model with unobserved price dis-
crimination, standard BLP model and BLP model with unobserved price discrimination
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Standard Logit Logit + unobs. prices Standard BLP BLP + unobs. prices
Parameter Std-err Parameter Std-err Parameter Std-err Parameter Std-err
Three doors
Age < 40, I = L 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.12 0.25∗ 0.12 -0.23 0.165
Age < 40, I = H -0.14 0.12 -0.14 0.12 0.03 0.12 -0.14 0.126
Age ∈ [40,59], I = L -0.16 0.12 -0.15 0.12 0.12 0.115 -0.36∗ 0.149
Age ∈ [40,59], I = H -0.29∗ 0.12 -0.29∗ 0.12 -0.06 0.117 -0.5∗∗ 0.146
Age ≤ 60, I = L -0.61∗∗ 0.12 -0.61∗∗ 0.12 -0.46∗∗ 0.113 -0.8∗∗ 0.142
Age ≤ 60, I = H -0.67∗∗ 0.12 -0.67∗∗ 0.12 -0.41∗∗ 0.112 -0.63∗∗ 0.114
Station-Wagon
Age < 40, I = L -0.72∗∗ 0.08 -0.71∗∗ 0.08 -0.79∗∗ 0.082 -0.84∗∗ 0.118
Age < 40, I = H -0.58∗∗ 0.08 -0.58∗∗ 0.08 -0.65∗∗ 0.081 -0.59∗∗ 0.09
Age ∈ [40,59], I = L -0.63∗∗ 0.08 -0.63∗∗ 0.08 -0.7∗∗ 0.08 -0.74∗∗ 0.103
Age ∈ [40,59], I = H -0.68∗∗ 0.08 -0.68∗∗ 0.08 -0.79∗∗ 0.082 -0.81∗∗ 0.1
Age ≤ 60, I = L -0.70∗∗ 0.08 -0.7∗∗ 0.08 -0.8∗∗ 0.081 -0.83∗∗ 0.096
Age ≤ 60, I = H -0.68∗∗ 0.08 -0.68∗∗ 0.08 -0.78∗∗ 0.081 -0.83∗∗ 0.08
Marginal cost equation
Intercept -0.79∗∗ 0.069 -0.63∗∗ 0.173
Horsepower 0.52∗∗ 0.027 0.26 0.244
Fuel economy -2.89∗∗ 0.356 -1.42∗ 0.699
Weight 1.06∗∗ 0.044 1.01† 0.572
Value of objective function 4213 4220 1601 1668
Number of observations 19,230 19,230 22,435 22,435
Table 4: Estimation of parameters : logit model, logit model with unobserved price dis-
crimination, standard BLP model and BLP model with unobserved price discrimination
(continued)
4.3 Comparison with the standard models
We compare the results implied by the standard model and the model with unobserved
price discrimination in the case of the random coefficient. The results of the comparison
of the models in the logit case is displayed in Appendix A.3.
Table 5 focuses on demand parameters and implied price elasticities for the standard model
and the model with unobserved price discrimination. Price elasticities are higher, in ab-
solute value for the model with unobserved prices than for the standard one. However,
this hides two opposite effects. On one side, parameters of price sensitivity are higher (in
absolute value) for the model with unobserved price discrimination, as suggested in Table
3. However, when posted prices are used instead of transaction prices, we overestimate
prices and so are price elasticities. At the end, the underestimating of price sensitivity
parameters is more important and implies smaller (in absolute value) price elasticities.10
10For the logit case, parameters of price sensitivities are estimated to be identical in the two models. At
the end we overestimate price elasticities when we estimate the standard model instead of the model with
unobserved discounts (we get an average of -4.6 with the standard logit model versus an average of -4.4
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In our model we find average price elasticities varying from is -4.5 to -6.4, which are in the
range of those obtained by BLP, who report elasticities between -3.5 and -6.5, but below
those of Langer (2012) who finds, when using transaction prices, a range between -6.4 to
-17.8.
Full model Standard BLP
Group of consumers αd εd αd εd
Age < 40, I = L −4.88
(0.4)
-6.44 −2.8
(0.24)
-4.32
Age < 40, I = H −3.92
(0.29)
-5.14 −2.72
(0.26)
-4.41
Age ∈ [40,59], I = L −4.3
(0.36)
-5.9 −2.16
(0.22)
-3.38
Age ∈ [40,59], I = H −4.04
(0.36)
-5.62 −2.15
(0.21)
-3.33
Age ≤ 60, I = L −4.09
(0.37)
-5.3 −2.36
(0.23)
-3.48
Age ≤ 60, I = H −3.46
(0.24)
-4.51 −1.91
(0.23)
-2.69
Std deviation (σp) 1.09
(0.08)
0.7
(0.09)
Average -4.13 -5.51 -2.21 -3.56
Table 5: Comparison of demand parameters and average price-elasticities for the standard
BLP model and the model with unobserved price discrimination
Table 6 displays average mark-ups for the different groups of consumers for the BLP model
with unobserved price discrimination and the standard BLP model11. We compute average
mark-ups weighting by actual sales in each group but also using the same weighting scheme
for all groups of consumers, namely, the overall market shares (“basket-weighted” method).
This allows to eliminate the demand composition effect. Average mark-ups for the same
artificial basket of cars are between 16.6%, for young people with low income and 24.2% for
old people with high income. The mark-ups corresponding to the standard BLP model are
much higher and the average mark-up reaches 32% compared to 20% implied by the model
with unobserved price discrimination. This shows that taking into account transaction
prices in the model may have important consequences for the validity of counter-factual
simulations.
with unobserved price discrimination. See Table 16 in Appendix A.3.
11See Table 17 in Appendix A.3 for the comparison of mark-ups in the logit case.
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Full model Standard BLP
Group of consumers Sales-weighted Basket-weighted Basket-weighted
Age < 40, I = L 16.9 16.6 31.9
Age < 40, I = H 20.9 21.1 31.2
Age ∈ [40,59], I = L 18.6 18.9 31.3
Age ∈ [40,59], I = H 19.5 19.8 31.4
Age ≤ 60, I = L 20.8 20.33 33.2
Age ≤ 60, I = H 24.2 24.2 32.7
Average 20.0 20.0 31.9
Reading notes: the “basket-weighted” discounts and mark-ups are obtained by
using the same artificial basket of cars for all groups.
Table 6: Comparison of implied average mark-ups for the standard BLP model and the
model with unobserved price discrimination (in %)
Finally, we perform non-nested tests to compare the standard model that assumes uniform
pricing on the supply side and the model with unobserved price discrimination using the
Rivers-Vuong test based on the lack-of-fit criteria (see Vuong, 1989 and Rivers & Vuong,
2002). This test use the estimated marginal costs implied by the two alternative models and
cost shifters. Specifically, it allows to find which marginal cost has the best statistical fit
given the observed cost shifters. It has been used a lot in differentiated markets to compare
two alternative competition models (see Bonnet & Dubois, 2010 and Ferrari & Verboven,
2012 for examples). We start by estimating the marginal cost equation by assuming:
Chjt = exp(w
h
j +W
′
jtλ
h)ηhjt,
where Chjt represents the estimated marginal cost implied by model h. whj represents the
product specific cost, Wjt are the cost shifters and ηhjt the unobserved cost shocks. We
transform the previous expression using the logarithm :
lnChjt = w
h
j +W
′
jtλ
h + ln ηhjt.
Assuming E(ln ηhjt|whj ,Wjt) = 0, we estimate λh using least squares:
min
λh,whj
1
n
∑(
lnChjt − whj +W ′jtλh
)2
In addition to those used in the estimation to construct supply-side moment conditions,
cost shifters include prices of raw materials involved in the production process such as
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rubber, petrol, platina and aluminium. These prices are interacted with the weight of the
car12.
The statistic test use the values of the lack-of-fit criterion:
Qhn =
1
n
∑(
lnChjt − whj +W ′jtλh
)2
The null hypothesis is that the two models are asymptotically equivalent while the first
alternative hypothesis (H1) is that the model with price discrimination (pd) is asymptoti-
cally better than the model with uniform pricing (up) and the second alternative hypothesis
(H1’) is that the model with uniform pricing (up) is asymptotically better than the model
with price discrimination (pd). Specifically :
H0 : lim
n=+∞
{
Qpdn (λ¯
pd, w¯pdj )−Qupn (λ¯up, w¯upj )
}
= 0
H1 : lim
n=+∞
{
Qpdn (λ¯
pd, w¯pdj )−Qupn (λ¯up, w¯upj )
}
< 0
H1’: lim
n=+∞
{
Qpdn (λ¯
pd, w¯pdj )−Qupn (λ¯up, w¯upj )
}
> 0
We compute Rivers and Vuong test statistic :
Tn =
√
n
σˆn
(
Q2n(λ¯
pd, w¯pdj )−Q1n(λ¯up, w¯upj )
)
,
which is asymptotically a standard normal variable under the null. In our data, we reject
the null hypothesis in favor of H1, meaning that the price discrimination model fits better
our data than the uniform pricing model.
5 Importance of price discrimination
5.1 Discounts
Table 7 presents the average discounts for all groups of consumers in the BLP model.
As before, we compute average discounts weighted by actual sales and using the “basket”
weights. The results with both weighting methods are however similar. As expected, the
pattern on average discounts across groups is similar to the one on price elasticity. The
estimated pivot group (the group assumed to be paying the posted price) is identical for
99.7% of the products and corresponds to the group with lower price elasticity. These
are the 15.7% people over 60 year old, and with income above 27,000 euros.13 We find a
12These raw material price indexes are published by CCFA to analyze the evolution of production costs.
13For the logit model with unobserved price discrimination, the pivot group is always the group of old
with high income purchasers.
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different pivot group for only 9 cars in 2003, namely the young consumers with high income.
This result is in line with those of Harless & Hoffer (2002), who show using observed dealer
margins that older buyers generate higher vehicle gross profit.
On average, the sales-weighted discount is 5.2%, with a substantial heterogeneity across
groups of consumers.14 Clearly, income and age are both important determinants of the
discount obtained. On average, young purchasers with a low income pay their car 9% less
than the posted price whereas young with a high income gets only 3.8% discount. These
percentages represent a gross gain of almost 2,000 euros for the low income group and only
slightly above 800 for the high income group. Old purchasers get very small discounts, only
4.9% (around 1,000 euros) in average for the group with low income. Middle age consumers
get large discounts (6.7% for the low income group and 5.6% for the high income group),
which represents a gross savings of 1,200 to 1,400 euros. Note that we assumed that the
posted prices are equal to the discriminatory prices for the pivot group, or, in other words
that we normalize their discount to zero. This assumption partly explains why we find
relatively small discounts.
In 2000, the UK Competition Commission investigated the competitiveness of the UK new
car market and gathered data on average discounts by brand and segment. The dataset is
very reliable since it was collected directly from dealers. The report (New cars: A report
on the supply of new motor cars within the UK (2000)) reveals that the average discount
lies between 7.5% and 8%, which is above our estimate of 5.2%. For our estimate to be
consistent, it implies that the average discount associated to the pivot group is roughly
slightly below 3% which is very plausible.
14For the logit case, we obtain an average of 4.2% See Table 18 in Appendix A.3.
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Average discount (in % of posted price) Average gross discount (in euros)
Group of consumers Sales-weighted Basket-weighted Sales-weighted Basket-weighted
Age < 40, I = L 9.04 9.16 1,785 1,936
Age < 40, I = H 3.81 3.95 844 872
Age ∈ [40,59], I = L 6.7 6.55 1,516 1,425
Age ∈ [40,59], I = H 5.55 5.49 1,309 1,213
Age ≤ 60, I = L 4.87 4.88 1,007 1,076
Age ≤ 60, I = H 0.01 0.01 6 10
Average 5.2 5.2 1,127 1,132
Reading notes: the “basket-weighted” discounts and mark-ups are obtained by using the same artificial
basket of cars for all groups.
Table 7: Average discounts by groups of consumers
Table 8 presents average discount for the different segments, as well as the market shares
associated. We can note that the luxury cars are those who offer the highest discount
in average (7.8% for Executive cars and 5.2% for Allroad vehicles). These cars are very
expensive and have to decrease their price by an important amount to sell to the more price
sensitive groups of consumers. One might expect luxury brands not to offer discounts as
part of their brand image, but our model does not incorporate this dimension. Moreover,
our model is static and thus firms offer discounts as long as the effect of increasing sales
compensate the effect of lowering the price. All the other segments have quite homogenous
average discounts, roughly between 4% and 5%.15
Segment Share Discount
Supermini 44.48% 4.73%
Executive 1.02% 7.8%
Small Family 15.8% 4.14%
Large Family 7.36% 4.4%
Small MPV 18.5% 4.26%
Large MPV 0.86% 4.64%
Sports 6.53% 4.43%
Allroad 5.43% 5.19%
Table 8: Average discounts by segment (sales-weighted)
Figure 1 presents the distribution of discounts for all sales. 98% of the discounts lie between
15For the average discount by segment in the logit model, see Table 19 of Appendix A.3.
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0 and 30%, and almost 16% of the cars were sold without discounts (purchases from the
pivot groups or with a discount lower than 1%). The distribution rapidly reaches its mode,
the value of 5%, and the frequency then decreases more slowly. Very few cars are sold with
more than 15% discount.16
The UK Competition Commission report refers to a consumer survey conducted in 1995
which asked automobile purchasers whether or not they obtained a discount over the posted
price. This survey reveals that 17% of purchasers paid the posted price whereas 37% bar-
gained and obtained a discount and 29% were automatically offered a discount. This figure
of 17% is very close to our estimation of 16% of the cars are sold with less than 1% discount.
Furthermore, the fact that some purchasers were “automatically offered a discount” cor-
roborates our assumption that discounts are used as a tool to price discrimination because
the posted price is not optimal for some consumers.
16Similar histogram for the logit model is displayed in Figure A.3 of Appendix A.3.
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Figure 1: Distribution of estimated discounts
We could not find precise and reliable data on transaction prices in the French automobile
market. Indeed, it is considered to be a strategic and confidential information for car deal-
ers.17 Specialized automobile magazines, online forum discussions and websites providing
guidance and tips to purchase a new car always refer to the capacity of buyers to negotiate
and obtain a discount. For example, when searching the keywords how much discount for
new car with google search engine (in French), the second website referenced is states that
discount are generally between 5% and 20%.18. The third website associated to the same
key words search is a forum answering the question of how much discount one can expect
17A first anecdote is that some manufacturers claim that they have to survey their own dealers to get
the information. The second evidence is that, on April 2014, an article from Reuters dealing with the
importance of discounts due to the economic crisis in the European car market uses some figures obtained
from a confidential internal industry survey.
18See http://www.choisir-sa-voiture.com/concessionnaire/meilleur-prix-voiture.php.
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to obtain on the purchase of a new car. One reply states that it should be expected at
most 20% discount while another one says that it is in average 6%.19. Our estimations are
overall consistent with these anecdotal evidences.
A recent study by Kaul et al. (2012) investigates the effect of the scrapping policy on
the magnitude of discounts in Germany using data collected to a sample of dealers. The
average discount they obtain is 14%, which is much higher than our estimates. Once again,
the assumption that the posted price is equal to the transaction price party explains this
difference. Moreover, their study concerns the period 2007-2010, which corresponds to the
beginning of the economic crisis and it is very likely that car dealers reacted to the bad
economic climate by reducing their margins and increasing the discounts.
We are more cautious about comparing our estimates with data from the US market which
has a very different organization. In the US, dealers are independent from the manufac-
turers and negotiation seems to be more common (see for example Morton et al. (2003)
and Busse et al. (2012)). Moreover, it is documented that manufacturers offering rebates
is a very common practice in the US market and is more comparable to our interpretation
of discounts. Consumers are usually aware of these rebates20. In their study of the effect
of scrapping policy on manufacturers rebates, Busse et al. (2012) report that 49% of cars
were sold with a manufacturer rebate and it equals 2,700 dollars in average, which roughly
represents 10% of the transaction price. This study provides evidence of heterogeneity in
rebates according to manufacturers, the national ones such as General Motors and Chrysler
offering higher than average rebates21.
They are few papers that correlate the magnitude of discounts to individual characteristics.
Using very precise data on dealer margins in Canada, Chandra et al. (2013) investigate
the evolution of price discrimination against women in the car industry. In the US mar-
ket, Harless & Hoffer (2002) using similar data and Langer (2012) using survey data on
transaction prices also investigates the correlation between car prices, gender and some
other demographic characteristics. All these studies report a significant heterogeneity in
discounts with respect to the age and find that the dealers margins are the highest for
the older age class, while the discounts are significantly higher for young purchasers. In
the Appendix of her paper, Langer (2012) documents significant price discrimination with
19See http://forum.hardware.fr/hfr/Discussions/Auto-Moto/negocier-voiture-concession-sujet_
15899_1.htm.
20The Kelley Blue Book website provides information on manufacturer’s suggested retail prices (MRSP),
rebates and target prices.
21See the regression Table 7 of the rebate on manufacturers dummies.
27
respect to the income, the high income groups of consumers (both men and women) are
associated to higher margins.
5.2 The impact of price discrimination on firms and consumers
If price discrimination is always profitable for a monopoly, this may not be the case in
an oligopoly, because price discrimination may reinforce competition among firms. At the
end, all firms may be worse-off than they would be if they could commit to a uniform
pricing strategy (Holmes, 1989, Corts, 1998). The effect on consumers is also ambiguous.
Even for a given group of consumers, some products may be cheaper without price dis-
crimination, and other more expensive. We investigate in this subsection the effect of price
discrimination on firms and consumers. For that purpose, we compute, using our estimates
of the model, the counterfactual prices and profits that would occur if firms could commit
to set equal prices for all groups of consumers.
Results on firm profits are displayed in Table 5.2. Gains from price discrimination are
rather small but heterogenous. We observe that if price discrimination is profitable for
68% of manufacturers, it makes 12 out of the 38 manufacturers worse off. The gains
associated to price discrimination are particularly high for luxury brands such as Mercedes
(+3.9%), Porsche (+7.2%) and Jaguar (+5.2%). Price discrimination appears to be also
profitable for the major French manufacturers (+1.8%, +1.2% and +2.1% for respectively
Renault, Peugeot and Citroen) but not profitable for Dacia (-1.5%). The total gain from
price discrimination is rather small but significant, the industry profit increases by 1.2%
compared to the uniform pricing equilibrium.
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Profit with price Profit without price Gain from
Brand discrimination (in Me) discrimination (in Me) discrimination (in %)
Renault 644.64 633.48 1.8%
Peugeot 550.74 544.19 1.2%
Citroen 451.84 442.44 2.1%
Volkswagen 181.37 181.72 -0.2%
Toyota 164.98 163.37 1%
Mercedes 153.05 147.36 3.9%
Ford 135.06 133.69 1%
B.M.W. 112.85 111.01 1.7%
Opel 110.28 110.34 -0.1%
Audi 91.87 92 -0.1%
Fiat 64.75 64.55 0.3%
Dacia 58.61 59.52 -1.5%
Suzuki 54.64 54.26 0.7%
Seat 53.9 53.97 -0.1%
Nissan 50.57 50.28 0.6%
Mini 35.57 35.79 -0.6%
Honda 30.84 30.44 1.3%
Hyundai 29.94 29.85 0.3%
Skoda 23.48 23.53 -0.2%
Mazda 19.77 19.77 0%
Alfa Romeo 18.87 18.92 -0.2%
Kia 18.32 18.27 0.3%
Land Rover 16.88 16.66 1.3%
Smart 11.51 11.49 0.1%
Mitsubishi 10.54 10.49 0.5%
Porsche 9.66 9.01 7.2%
Jeep 7.36 7.36 0%
Chrysler 6.54 6.54 0%
Lancia 4.99 4.93 1.1%
Saab 4.46 4.4 1.2%
Dodge 3.41 3.44 -0.8%
Daewoo 3.36 3.35 0.4%
Jaguar 3.02 2.87 5.2%
Ssangyong 2.01 2.05 -1.8%
Daihatsu 1.99 1.97 0.9%
Subaru 1.98 2.01 -1.1%
Lexus 1.63 1.61 1.3%
Rover 0.05 0.05 0.6%
Total Industry 3145 3107 1.2%
Reading notes: Profits are annual profits, for the year 2007, in million euros. The gains from
price discrimination represent the profit gains or losses of switching from the uniform pricing
equilibrium to the equilibrium with price discrimination.
Table 9: Gains and losses from price discrimination by brand.
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We also investigate the effect of price discrimination on consumers. In Table 10, we compute
the average price differences between the uniform and the discriminatory prices for each
group of consumers and report the number of products for which the discriminatory price is
lower than the uniform one (see column 2). We can see that, except for the more sensitive
group (the young consumers with low income), all groups have some products that become
cheaper in the uniform pricing equilibrium. The middle-age groups experience significant
gains with price discrimination (average gains are 270 and 59 euros for respectively low
and high income groups). The highest average price difference between the two regimes is
for the pivot group (old and high income) and it reaches around 1,100 euros.
#{j : pdj < Average gains in purchases
Group of consumers Frequency puniformj } Sales-weighted Basket-weighted
Age < 40, I = L 15.7 3,205 673 781
Age < 40, I = H 11.5 185 -326 -283
Age ∈ [40,59], I = L 16.3 3,107 262 270
Age ∈ [40,59], I = H 22.3 2,057 71 59
Age ≤ 60, I = L 20.8 1,011 -49 -79
Age ≤ 60, I = H 13.2 8 -1,072 -1,145
Reading notes: the third column indicates how much products (among the 3,205) have lower
prices with the price discrimination regime. The “basket-weighted” discounts and mark-ups
are obtained by using the same artificial basket of cars for all groups.
Table 10: Gains of price discrimination for groups of consumers.
In Table 11, we explore the effect of price discrimination on the total sales for each group
of consumers. As expected, for some groups, pricer discrimination increases the total sales
while it decreases for other groups. The overall effect is moderate but positive : price
discrimination increases total sales by 1.2%.
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Price discrimination Uniform pricing Gain from discrimination
Age < 40, I = L 110,945 94,619 14.7%
Age < 40, I = H 95,006 98,940 -4.1%
Age ∈ [40,59], I = L 104,788 100,501 4.1%
Age ∈ [40,59], I = H 222,094 219,141 1.3%
Age ≤ 60, I = L 155,699 155,202 0.3%
Age ≤ 60, I = H 147,975 165,033 -11.5%
Total 836,508 826,226 1.2%
Table 11: Comparison of total number of purchases for groups of consumers with price
discrimination and uniform pricing.
Finally, we measure the effect of price discrimination on consumers surplus. Overall, price
discrimination is moderately benefic for consumers as it increases average individual surplus
by 0.25%. Again, this moderate positive global effect hides some winners and some losers.
The group that experience the highest welfare gain is the group of middle-age consumers
with high income (+3.4%) and the group associated with the highest surplus loss is, not
surprisingly, the pivot group (-1.9%).
Price discrimination Uniform pricing Gain from discrimination
Age < 40, I = L 13,738 13,276 3.37%
Age < 40, I = H 19,748 19,871 -0.63%
Age ∈ [40,59], I = L 15,970 15,768 1.26%
Age ∈ [40,59], I = H 21,207 21,120 0.41%
Age ≤ 60, I = L 17,780 17,777 0.02%
Age ≤ 60, I = H 25,912 26,407 -1.91%
Average 18879 18833 0.25%
Table 12: Comparison of average individual surplus for the different groups of consumers
with price discrimination and uniform pricing.
6 Conclusion
This paper investigates the recurrent problem of using posted prices instead of transaction
prices in structural models of demand and supply in markets with differentiated products.
We propose an approach based on the inclusion of some unobserved price discrimination
by firms based on observable individual characteristics. This approach requires to have
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data on aggregate sales on the corresponding groups of purchasers and, as usually, charac-
teristics of products. We use this model to describe the French new car market where price
discrimination may occur through discounts. Our results suggest significant discounting by
manufacturers. They appear to be very consistent with previous studies on price disper-
sions, dealers data collected by the UK Competition Commission and anecdotic evidences
on the magnitude of discount in the French market.
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A Appendix
A.1 Additional descriptive statistics
Group Characteristics Frequency of null sale
1 Age < 40, Income <27,000 11.6%
2 Age < 40, Income >27,000 10.3%
3 Age ∈ [40,59], Income <27,000 7.5%
4 Age ∈ [40,59], Income >27,000 4%
5 Age ≥ 60, Income <27,000 7.8%
6 Age ≥ 60, Income >27,000 7.6%
Table 13: Fraction of product with null market shares in the final sample
A.2 Additional tables
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A.3 Results with the logit specification
Group of consumers With unobs. prices Standard Logit
Age < 40, I = L -4.91 -5.37
Age < 40, I = H -4.96 -5.33
Age ∈ [40,59], I = L -4.58 -4.77
Age ∈ [40,59], I = H -4.4 -4.51
Age ≤ 60, I = L -3.98 -4.04
Age ≤ 60, I = H -3.94 -3.92
Average -4.4 -4.6
Table 16: Comparison of demand parameters and average price-elasticities for the standard
Logit model and the logit model with unobserved price discrimination
Logit with unobs. prices Standard logit
Group of consumers Sales-weighted Basket-weighted Basket-weighted
Age < 40, I = L 23.74 22.96 25.76
Age < 40, I = H 23.81 24.11 24.82
Age ∈ [40,59], I = L 26.02 26.58 24.79
Age ∈ [40,59], I = H 27.3 27.94 24.84
Age ≤ 60, I = L 29.25 28.42 26.49
Age ≤ 60, I = H 29.78 29.8 25.78
Average 26.81 26.79 25.39
Reading notes: the “basket-weighted” discounts and mark-ups are obtained by
using the same artificial basket of cars for all groups.
Table 17: Comparison of implied average mark-ups for the standard logit model and the
logit model with unobserved price discrimination (in %)
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Average discount (in % of posted price) Average gross discount (in euros)
Group of consumers Sales-weighted Basket-weighted Sales-weighted Basket-weighted
Age < 40, I = L 9.53 9.3 1673 1690
Age < 40, I = H 7.75 7.87 1419 1430
Age ∈ [40,59], I = L 4.47 4.62 829 838
Age ∈ [40,59], I = H 2.66 2.72 492 494
Age ≤ 60, I = L 2.1 2.04 373 370
Age ≤ 60, I = H 0 0 0 0
Average 4.15 4.15 748 753
Reading notes: the “basket-weighted” discounts and mark-ups are obtained by using the same artificial
basket of cars for all groups.
Table 18: Average discounts by groups of consumers for the logit model
Segment Freq. Discount
Supermini 44.48% 5.36%
Executive 1.02% 1.5%
Small Family 15.8% 3.74%
Large Family 7.36% 2.46%
Small MPV 18.5% 3.36%
Large MPV 0.86% 2.19%
Sports 6.53% 3%
Allroad 5.43% 2.12%
Table 19: Average discounts by segment (sales-weighted) for the logit model
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Figure 2: Distribution of estimated discounts for the logit model
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